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Outline of content: The article sheds light on the questions related to the presence of Christians 
in the Georgian territories and demonstrates the important role played by the Georgian Apostolic 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the history of the Georgian people. As the national identity 
of the Georgians is closely tied to Christianity and autonomous structures of the Church, which 
has a profound impact of relations with non-Georgian communities (Georgia has the largest 
percentage of ethnic minorities in the Southern Caucasus) inhabiting Georgia for centuries, 
speaking its language, but regarded as “alien” due to their “non-Georgian” religion. The fact 
that the new authorities provided the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church 
with an exceptional role in the state (after the country regained its independence in 1991) 
has exacerbated ethnic, religious, and social conflicts in Georgia, which translates into the 
relations of the country with its neighbours. Such are the questions examined by the author 
in  the presented article. The author reveals how, under the conditions in Georgia resulting 
from the specific relations between the Church and the State, religion was instrumentalised and 
used to achieve immediate political aims. Her conclusion is that religion in Georgia inspires 
nationalist entities and supports nationalism.
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The 21st century has drawn attention to religion as a factor explaining international 
relations and mechanisms of the functioning of the world and politics. Until then, 
the role of religion was ignored in social sciences – the reason being that studies 
focused mainly on Western countries, where religious influences were the smallest.1 
It had also been mistakenly believed that with the progress of modernisation 
(understood as westernisation) religious influences in other parts of the world 
1  This was noticed by J. Fox and S. Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, New 
York, 2004. 
118 Renata Król-Mazur
would wane. Meanwhile, one of the consequences of the modernisation processes 
was a resurgence of religion (as well as reaching towards religious legitimacy).2 
In a considerable part of the world, democracy is an attack on social systems 
based on religious principles. Georges Corm rightly points out that the moment 
religion began losing its transcendental character and started being used for 
political purposes by power systems leading societies, many believers – including 
politicians who did not accept such a situation – proclaimed the need to return 
to the sources, return to the roots. This was creating a situation in which it was 
easy to confuse religious identity with national identity. The appeal to religion 
would also become a remedy for deep disenchantment with politics, as well as 
a remedy for the devaluing system of shaping a modern national identity, rising 
above ethnicity and religious specificity.3 According to some theories, there is an 
increasingly strong relationship between religion and internal and external conflicts. 
There is a growing phenomenon of “politicisation of religion” – religion begins to 
perform integratory functions, as well as mobilising, educational, and ultimately 
also a political function.4 
The subject of the following discussion will be the impact of the religious 
factor on the changes taking place in the Republic of Georgia after 1991. It will 
be analysed both as a generator of conflict (ethnic, social, international), as well as 
soothing, or solving, the conflict. As in the subject literature there are quite a lot 
of studies approaching this issue in a theoretical manner, this text will be a case 
study.5 The author will attempt to trace how different actors of a religious nature 
in Georgia may be impacting, directly and indirectly, on the internal politics of 
the state, and to what extent it is relevant for shaping international relations. Of 
main interest will be tracing the relationship between the stance (support or lack 
thereof) of the religious authority that is the Catholicos Ilia II towards specific 
conflicts, and to what extent this becomes a factor leading to the outbreak or the 
end of a conflict. 
For more than sixteen centuries, Georgia has been an orthodox Christian 
country.6 Since the Middle Ages, the Georgian Church7 has been developing 
2  M. Marczewska-Rytko, Religia i polityka w globalizującym się świecie, Lublin, 2010, pp. 80–86.
3  G. Corm, Religia i polityka w XXI wieku, transl. E. Cylwik, Warszawa, 2007, p. 86. 
4  A. Legucka, Geopolityczne uwarunkowania i konsekwencje konfliktów zbrojnych na obszarze pro-
radzieckim, Warszawa, 2013, p. 108. 
5  T. Szyszlak, “Próby teoretycznego ujęcia postradzieckich konfliktów religijnych”, in: Religia i pol-
ityka na obszarze Europy Wschodniej, Kaukazu i Azji Centralnej, ed. T. Stępniewski, Lublin–
Warszawa, 2013, pp. 49–64; S. Matiunin, “Konflikty religijne na terenie byłego ZSRR”, in: Religie 
i kościoły w społeczeństwach postkomunistycznych, ed. I. Borowik, A. Szyjewski, Kraków, 1993, 
pp. 204–209; Религия и конфликт, ed. А. Малашенко, С. Филатов, Москва, 2007.
6  In the eastern part of Georgia, in Iberia, Christianity was recognised as the ruling religion in the 
year 337, and autocephaly – in 483. In the western part, Lazika, it took place only in 523; 
D. Zadura, “Chrześcijaństwo i Kościół narodowy w historii Gruzji – od źródeł do okresu sowiec-
kiego”, Pro Georgia. Journal of Kartvelological studies, 19 (2009), pp. 134–136. Cf. also: G. Peradze, 
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a particular sense 7of religious separateness both from the world of Islam and 
the world of the Orthodox Church – through language, own tradition (also in 
architecture and church singing) and a number of national and religious myths.8 
The national identity of Georgians is strongly associated with Christianity and 
separate ecclesiastical structures.9 For many centuries, the Georgian Church has 
been a strong institution of a national character, which, especially after Georgia 
lost its statehood, has fulfilled, parallel to religious services, specific political and 
social functions: cultivating national memory, and guarding national traditions 
and culture. The long tradition of autocephaly and the differences resulting from 
autonomous development have created a specific sense of attachment to the 
Church, which Georgians have expressed by opposing its subordination to the 
Russian Orthodox Church, or the Russian Empire, or Soviet authorities.10 
As a result of Russia’s policies on Georgian territories (the 1811 liquidation of 
autocephaly of the Georgian Church and the lack of respect for Georgian traditions), 
the initial sympathy for Russia based on common religion (for which Georgians 
did not support the Caucasian highlanders in their struggle against Russians), 
and a search for an ally in the fight against Turks, were replaced by resentment and 
hostility.11 After the abolition of the Caucasian Governorate in 1882, and tightening 
the Russification policy towards Georgians – particularly the war on language – the 
authorities tried to strengthen the Russian ethnic group on Georgian territories. 
Georgians were settled into areas on the coasts of the Black Sea in the place of 
displaced Muslims, and ethnic minorities inhabiting Georgian territories – in 
particular Ossetians – were supported. The Russian Empire put a wedge between 
Georgian tribes, using differences between the Georgian and Megrelian languages 
– creating a new alphabet for the Megrelian language, promoting it, and affirming 
Megrelians in their conviction of being distinct from other Georgian tribes.12
“Problemy historii początków Kościoła Gruzińskiego”, in: id., Dzieła zebrane, vol.  2, ed. Rev. 
H. Paprocki, Warszawa, 2011, pp. 7–25; R.G. Suny, The Making of Georgian Nation, Blooming-
ton, 1994, pp. 20–41.
7  Its official name is the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church. In this work, the 
author uses the term “the Georgian Church” (qartuli eklesia).
8  The Georgian Church was united in the 12th century, when the Patriarch of Antioch accepted 
jurisdiction claims of the Catholicos of Mtskheta to the entire Georgian language territory. The 
result of the unification of Church structures in the east and west of Georgia was receiving the 
title of the Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia by the Mtskheta Patriarchs; Zadura, Chrześci-
jaństwo i Kościół narodowy, pp. 133, 141. 
9  The importance of religion as a factor shaping the development of the Georgian nation was 
deliberately ignored in Soviet literature and historiography. 
10  D. Zadura, “Naród w tygrysiej skórze. Tożsamość narodowa Gruzinów w dobie ‘rewolucji róż’”, 
in: Dylematy kaukaskie. Problemy narodowościowe i migracyjne, ed. M. Ząbek, Warszawa, 2010, 
pp. 286–287. 
11  N. Sabanadze, Globalization and nationalism: the cases of Georgia and the Basque country, Buda-
pest–New York, 2010, http://books.openedition.org/ceup/573, [point 20] (access: 1 July 2015).
12  A. Furier, Droga Gruzji do niepodległości, Poznań, 2009, p. 61.
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Georgia is a country where internal ethnographic differences13 are highly visible 
to this day. Most of the differences are due to historical reasons and date back to 
the times of Georgian tribes (including Kartvelians, Megrelians and Svans), united 
before our era. The long period of existence of two Georgian countries – Eastern 
(Iberia) and Western (Colchis), two directions from which Christianity arrived 
(to the western kingdom from Byzantium, to the eastern one from Syria and 
Palestine), and the existence of two areas of influence of powerful neighbours (in 
the western part – Greece, Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire, and in the eastern 
part – Persia), all this has affected the consolidation of ethnographic differences.14 
In Georgia, the ethnic mosaic is complemented by religious divisions. Religious 
heterogeneity within a single ethnic group is the result of a turbulent history. 
Wars and political events triggered waves of emigration of the settled people and 
an influx of displaced groups from other areas. 
As a result of the historical turmoil, a complicated ethnic and religious sit-
uation evolved on Georgian lands. Currently, Georgia is the country with the 
highest percentage of ethnic minorities in the South Caucasus. More than 80% 
of citizens are ethnic Georgians, of which the vast majority (83%) belong to the 
Georgian Church. Nearly 10% of Georgian residents are Muslim,15 and about 6% 
are followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Apart from the Orthodox Church, 
Islam, and the Armenian Church, the so-called traditional religions of Georgia 
also include Roman Catholicism (about 35,000 of followers) and Judaism (about 
10,000 followers). The number of Yazidis living in Georgia is estimated at 18,000. 
The Protestant communities are difficult to estimate, but do not exceed 1%.16
In Soviet times, the Georgian Church experienced repressions similar to other 
churches – first, its assets were taken away, then churches were closed, and the 
clergy and believers persecuted.17 Stalinist repressions were aimed at religions in 
general, and so other churches fell victim to them as well. The communists’ noto-
rious hostility towards religion had not just doctrinal or ideological justification, 
but also pragmatic. The church was seen in the terms of a quasi-political force, 
competing with the official, state centre of authority, and its existence successfully 
13  Ethnographic group are identified on the basis of separate, objective cultural characteristics, 
although not always the awareness of separateness. They usually form part of ethnic groups and 
communities or appear on their overlap. See: Zadura, Naród w tygrysiej skórze, p. 291.
14  Ibid., pp. 291–292.
15  They are mainly Azeris, residents of Adjara, Chechens, some Abkhazians, Tatars and Avars.
16  G. Rtskhiladze, “Religion and Conflict Potential in Georgia”, Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
3 (39) (2005), p. 56. The data did not change greatly over the next years, cf. Georgia 2013 Inter-
national Religious Freedom Report, Department of State USA, www.state.gov/documents/organ-
ization/222429.pdf (access: 15 July 2015). 
17  For more on this topic see G. Peradze, “Kościół Gruziński pod bolszewizmem”, in: id., Dzieła 
zebrane, pp. 285–288; T.T. Chmielowski, “Kościół Prawosławny w Gruzji w latach zaboru rosyj-
skiego i władzy sowieckiej (XIX–XX w.)”, Archiwa, Biblioteki i Muzea Kościelne, 70 (1998), 
pp. 303–313.
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prevented monopolisation and centralisation of power by the communists.18 
Repressions experienced by the Georgian Church led to the decision of the Holy 
Synod of the Georgian Church in 1927 that, in order to survive, it needed to 
cooperate with the new authorities and stay loyal to them.19 
The Georgian Church began to fully emphasise its cultural role in the history 
of Georgia during the thaw associated with Gorbachev’s perestroika. At this time, 
standing up for the Georgian Church became a manifestation of national identity. 
At mass demonstrations, crosses and icons, hated and forbidden by authorities, 
were used as a symbol.20 This extremely strong emphasis on the role of the national 
Church was a protest against atheistic communism and persecutions, which both 
the Church and the Georgian nation suffered from the Russian Empire and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).21 The actions of the Georgian Church 
have been in line with the noticeable patterns of the era of political transformations 
after the fall of communism. A process occurring in most countries which regained 
their independence is using the occasion by local churches, mainly Orthodox 
churches, to fill the void left behind by ideological communism, thereby strength-
ening their presence in the public space, which for decades had been forced out.22 
They also make demands to the state to recognise them as dominant in a given 
territory, and to limit the rights of the followers of other religions, which in practice 
prevents their institutional development.23 
Georgians saw to it that the most important legal act granted their Church 
a unique role in the country. The Georgian constitution, adopted by the parlia-
ment on 24 August 1995, in the article 14 guarantees all citizens freedom and 
equality before the law, irrespective of their religion, their national, ethnic and 
social background, or their beliefs. This is repeated in the article 38, paragraph 1 
(“Citizens of Georgia shall be equal in their social, economic, cultural and political 
lives irrespective of national, ethnic, religious, or language origin”), and the article 
19, paragraph 1 specifies these provisions, ensuring everyone has the freedom of 
speech, opinion, religion or conviction, provided that they do not infringe the 
18  R. Zenderowski, Religia a tożsamość narodowa i nacjonalizm w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. 
Między etnicyzacją religii a sakralizacją etnosu (narodu), Wrocław, 2011, pp. 80–81.
19  Zadura, Chrześcijaństwo i Kościół narodowy, p. 153.
20  The Catholicos e.g. unsuccessfully tried to persuade people to disperse on 9 April 1989, when 
the armed forces of the Transcaucasian Military District massacred demonstrators gathered in 
Rustaveli Avenue in Tbilisi; W. Materski, Gruzja, Warszawa, 2010, p. 258. 
21  R. Król-Mazur, “Polityczne aspekty działalności Prawosławnego Autokefalicznego Apostolskiego 
Kościoła Gruzińskiego po 1991 r.”, in: Na wschód od linii Curzona. Księga Jubileuszowa dedy-
kowana profesorowi Mieczysławowi Smoleniowi, ed. R. Król-Mazur, M. Lubina, Kraków, 2014, 
p. 281; cf. also A. Furier, “Znaczenie relacji między Kościołem a władzami państwowymi dla 
kształtowania się państwa i narodu gruzińskiego”, in: Etniczność a religia, ed. A. Posern-Zieliń-
ski, Poznań, 2003, p. 155.
22  Zenderowski, Religia a tożsamość, pp. 93–94.
23  Ibid., p. 95.
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rights and freedoms of others.24 What is more, paragraph 2 of the aforementioned 
article prohibits any manifestations of religious hatred, and paragraph 3 contains 
rules prohibiting any restrictions on the right to religious freedom.25 Unfortunately, 
these provisions remained a dead letter for a long time.26
As a result of fierce fighting in the parliament, the Georgian Church was 
granted a unique role in the country, which was reflected in the article 9, para-
graph 1 of the Constitution: “The State shall declare absolute freedom of belief 
and religion. At the same time, the State shall recognise the outstanding role 
of the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia in the history of 
Georgia and its independence from the State”.27 In this way, Georgia became the 
second country, next to Armenia, which departed from the principle of separation 
of church and state.28 
As the Constitution at the same time guaranteed the freedom of other religions, 
on 30 March 2001 paragraph 2 was added to article 9, which stated that the 
relationship between the state and the Georgian Church would be regulated by 
constitutional agreement. It was signed on 14 October 2002 in the Svetitskhoveli 
Cathedral in Mtskheta by Ilia II and Eduard Shevardnadze, and then ratified 
on 22 October by the parliament and the Holy Synod, despite the opposition of 
Georgian lawyers and professionals from the European Parliament. Its signing was 
justified mainly by historical reasons – the fact of it being a State religion and its 
impact on the formation of culture, worldview, and national values.29 The agree-
ment consists of 12 articles, preceded by a preamble.30 As part of the Constitution, 
it is superior to other legal acts and provides recognition for the rank of the 
Georgian Church. It recognises the legal personality of the Georgian Church, its 
institution, and the inviolability of the Catholicos as Patriarch of All Georgia (article 
1, paragraph 3, 4, 5). It also regulates issues such as holidays, marriage, confession, 
chaplains, religious education (the Georgian Church has the exclusive right to 
24  The Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, Parliament of Georgia, http:// www.parliament.ge/
files/68_1944_951190_CONSTIT_27_12 June pdf (access: 18 November 2014); G. Kuca, M. Grzy-
bowski, System konstytucyjny Gruzji, Warszawa, 2012, p. 25.
25  The Constitution of the Republic of Georgia.
26  In order to defend and respect human rights, on 15 September 1991 Georgia adopted the Dec-
laration of Human Rights, thus taking on the obligation to respect and defend the right to 
freedom, imposed by the United Nations Organisation.
27  The Constitution of the Republic of Georgia.
28  See also T.J. Szyszlak, “Wolność religijna w konstytucjach i ustawach wyznaniowych państw 
postradzieckich”, Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego, 10 ( 2007), pp. 242–243.
29  T.J. Szyszlak, “Stosunki państwa z Apostolskim Autokefalicznym Kościołem Prawosławnym we 
współczesnej Gruzji”, in: Badania wschodnie. Polityka wewnętrzna i międzynarodowa, 
ed. W. Baluk, Z.J. Winnicki, Wrocław, 2008, p. 80.
30  See “Porozumienie Konstytucyjne między Państwem Gruzińskim i Gruzińskim Apostolskim 
Autokefalicznym Kościołem Prawosławnym z 14 X 2002”, transl. T. Szyszlak, in: ibid., pp. 361–
364.
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compose programmes for teaching religion and appointing lecturers31), property 
and financing of the Church.32 Under the agreement, the Georgian Church has 
been exempt from paying property taxes, and the person acting as the Catholicos 
has penal immunity. The Government has also promised to return to the Georgian 
Church all the lands and movable properties confiscated after the 1917,33 including 
those currently in the collections of national museums. It has also been promised 
that compensation would be paid for years of persecution, and support would be 
provided for the construction of seminars for clerics who are to serve in the army 
and prisons. The Georgian Church has been given a decisive voice on the issue of 
bringing non-Orthodox religious literature to Georgia and building new religious 
objects – which in practice means subordinating other religious associations to it.34 
The Georgian Church has also obtained other privileges set down in the con-
stitutional agreement and other legal acts. Difficulties have been introduced to 
registering religious associations and faith groups as well as issuing the approval of 
the construction of temples by other religions. The Georgian Church has been given 
buildings and churches previously owned by Catholics (Gori, Kutaisi, Batumi). It 
has also received tax breaks, subsidies from the central budget and the possibility 
of obtaining grants from local government budgets, as well as the right to open 
its own schools. The Georgian church is making constant efforts to strengthen its 
position, using constitutional provisions to this end.35 In 1999 some proposed to 
proclaim the Orthodox Church as state religion – this message was promoted by 
the leader of the movement Our Georgia, Guram Sharadze.36 In 2006, 65% of the 
Georgian society expressed its support.37
31  In most cases, education in post-Soviet states has been secular in character.
32  Porozumienie Konstytucyjne między Państwem Gruzińskim, pp. 361–364; The Political Landscape 
of Georgia. Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects, ed. G. Nodia, Á. Pinto 
Scholtbach, Delft, 2006, pp. 69–71; P. Nieczuja-Ostrowski, “Religia w polityce w państwach Kau-
kazu Południowego”, in: Religia i polityka na obszarze Europy Wschodniej, Kaukazu i Azji Cen-
tralnej, ed. T. Stępniewski, Lublin–Warszawa, 2013, p. 298; L. Kończak, “Religia i konflikty 
religijne w niepodległej Gruzji”, in: Konflikty na obszarze byłego ZSRR, ed. P. Adamczewski, 
Poznań, 2009, pp. 167–168.
33  A. Curanović, “Religie, Kościoły i konflikty międzywyznaniowe w regionie Kaukazu”, in: Wpro-
wadzenie do Studiów Wschodnioeuropejskich, vol. 4: Armenia, Azerbejdżan, Gruzja – przeszłość 
i teraźniejszość, ed. M. Korzeniowski, D. Tarasiuk, K. Latawiec, Lublin, 2013, p. 201.
34  Porozumienie Konstytucyjne między Państwem Gruzińskim, pp. 361–364; A. Curanović, “Rosyj-
sko-Kaukaskie sąsiedztwo w kontekście stosunków międzywyznaniowych”, in: Kaukaz w stosun-
kach międzynarodowych. Przeszłość, teraźniejszość, przyszłość, ed. P. Olszewski, K. Borkowski, 
Piotrków Trybunalski, 2008, pp. 381–382.
35  Curanović, Rosyjsko-kaukaskie sąsiedztwo, pp. 381–382; Kończak, Religia i konflikty, pp. 167–
168, 171.
36  He was shot in 2007 in a Tbilisi street; Szyszlak, Stosunki państwa, p. 83; Kończak, Religia 
i konflikty, p. 165.
37  A. Szabaciuk, “Między konfliktem a pokojem. Polityka etniczna i wyznaniowa Gruzji w latach 
1991–2012”, Wschodnioznawstwo, 2012, p. 68.
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According to a Win/Gallup International Association report, published at 
the beginning of 2015, Georgia was in the top ten most religious countries in the 
world.38 In reality, however, Georgians know little about their religion, although 
they participate in rituals and ceremonies increasingly actively. To a large extent, 
they are motivated by a need to define their affiliation with a particular community.
When reclaiming their freedom, Georgians combined nationalist slogans with 
Orthodox faith, and a “real Georgian” meant the one who belonged to the Georgian 
Church. In ideological sense, Georgians who were Catholics, Muslims or atheists 
were excluded from the nation. As a result, the Georgian Church was for a long 
time the only one that could function in Georgia, which was in contrast to its 
centuries-old tradition.39 Followers of religions traditionally rooted in Georgia are 
not considered to be Georgians.40 The escalation of nationalism has been, in a way, 
a response to colonisation and Russification. The Georgian Church has had to find 
its feet in the new situation, as after the fall of the USSR sects, until then fought 
against by Soviet authorities, were also able to function in Georgia. Other churches 
and religious organisations could also be active. Their appearance was perceived 
as a sign of globalisation.41 The progressive changes that occurred during this 
period led to the overlap of two extremisms – religious and national. Nationalism 
pulled the Orthodox Church into its orbit, and the citizens of Georgia could often 
hear: “You are not Georgian, but Armenian, Polish, Russian, or someone yet 
different”.42 A result of such an attitude has been numerous acts of violence (while 
police and authorities remained passive) committed by radical members of the 
Georgian Church on representatives of other religious groups (especially Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and Hare Krishnas, Baptists, or Pentecostals). In the years 1998 to 2003 
in particular, there were frequent pogroms and raids on their temples, while their 
literature was destroyed. Orthodox radicals put forward requests to expel “sects”,43 
38  Грузия вошла в десятку самых религиозных стран, Православие. Ru, 14 April 2015, http://
www.pravoslavie.ru/news/78649.htm (access: 15 December 2015). 
39  Kończak, Religia i konflikty, p. 164.
40  Rtskhiladze, Religion and Conflict, p. 56.
41  In conditions of globalisation, through measures of mass communication and great migratory 
movements it is possible to learn more about other religions, and societies become multi-faith. 
This confrontation between foreign cultures and religions in some countries – in this case also 
in Georgia – causes the so-called cultural defence. In the case of Georgia, religion (represented 
by the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church) is permanently inscribed in the 
history and culture of this nation. On the topic of Churches’ attitudes towards globalisation, see 
an interesting text by J. Mariański, “Globalizacja i Kościoły – sprzymierzeńcy czy konkurenci”, 
in: Religia i religijność w warunkach globalizacji, ed. M. Libiszowska-Żółtkowska, Kraków, 2007, 
pp. 105–126. 
42  “Gruzin nie może być katolikiem”, Niedziela, 11 June 2008, www.niedziela.pl/wiad.
php?p=200806&idw=149 (access: 4 November 2013).
43  Proselytism practised in Georgia by a variety of “destructive” sects was mentioned at the meet-
ing with the Armenian minority, in Krakow on 25 March 2013, by the Archbishop Raphaël 
Minassian, the head of Armenian Catholics in Eastern Europe.
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and restrict religious freedom.44 There were incidents of public burning of incon-
venient religious literature, as well as destroying and looting the offices of non-gov-
ernmental organisations involved in the protection of human rights.45 At that 
time there were fierce public debates on foreign cultural and religious influences 
and the role of the Orthodox Church in the preservation of Georgians’ national 
identity. G. Sharadze accused the US Ambassador to Georgia, Richard Miles, and 
other members of the international community of supporting “sects”, and thus 
of anti-Georgian activities, claiming that it is a duty of the Georgians to defend 
themselves against the threat posed by foreign religious groups to their nation and 
tradition.46 At the end of August 2002, the spokesman for the Georgian Church 
Zurab Tskhovrebadze stated that, together with the Georgian Patriarchate, the whole 
leadership of the country and the society as a whole should join the fight against 
sects. He described sects as the “fifth column”, which should be disarmed, but not 
by resorting to violence.47 According to the data presented in the International 
Religious Freedom Report for 2013 published by the US State Department 
(Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour), despite the persecution 
experienced by “non-traditional religious groups” in Georgia, such as Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Baptists, Pentecostals, Hare Krishnas, their number continues to grow.48 
At the start of February 2002, representatives of Georgian Catholics, Jews, 
Muslims, Lutherans and Baptists issued an open letter to the President of Georgia, 
E. Shevardnadze, requesting the use of necessary measures against violence on 
religious grounds. Half a year later, 15 US Members of Congress proposed to the 
President of Georgia the use of effective measures to this end.49 
Although in the case of large denominations, such as Roman Catholics, Muslims 
or followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church, going to church and taking part 
in a service does not pose difficulties, functioning in social life (school, university, 
work) is a serious problem.50 The situation of ethnic and religious minorities has 
been appraised negatively by the Council of Europe and its Advisory Committee 
on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.51 
44  The Political Landscape of Georgia, pp. 71–72; Zadura, Naród w tygrysiej skórze, p. 285.
45  Szyszlak, Stosunki państwa, p. 83.
46  N. Sabanadze, Globalization and nationalism: the cases of Georgia and the Basque country, Buda-
pest–New York, 2010, http://books.openedition.org/ceup/573 [point 79] (access: 1 July 2015).
47  Szyszlak, Stosunki państwa, pp. 83–84.
48  Georgia 2013 International Religious Freedom Report, Department of State USA, www.state.gov/
documents/organization/222429.pdf (access: 15 July 2015). 
49  Szyszlak, Stosunki państwa, p. 85.
50  Gruzin nie może być katolikiem.
51  In 2005, Georgia ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
and began a broad period of cooperation with the OSCE High Commissioner to protect the 
rights of minorities and to promote their integration into mainstream Georgian society, N. Saba-
nadze, Globalization and nationalism: the cases of Georgia and the Basque country, Budapest–New 
York, 2010, http://books.openedition.org/ceup/573 [point 88] (access: 1 July 2015).
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In the critical report from 12 October 2009, the situation of ethnic and religious 
minorities in the country was deemed as one of its most serious internal issues. 
Attention was drawn to the growing religious tensions stemming from the fact 
that the authorities favour the Georgian Church, and other religious organisations 
are unable to register.52
Georgian lawyers fighting for human rights point out that nationalist Christian 
groups are also hostile towards Jews, which in the future may contribute to an 
outbreak of further conflicts.53 Acts of anti-Semitism are on the rise, such as the 
incident on 4 December 2013 in Tbilisi, when protests took place against Hanukkah 
celebrations and the participation of the President Giorgi Margvelashvili, during 
which cries of “Jew” addressed to the President could be heard. The two major 
ringleaders were arrested and fined in the amount of 100 lari. A Holy Mass in their 
intention took place, organised outside the Israeli Embassy by a group of priests 
of the Georgian Church. While Catholicos himself commented on these events as 
“unacceptable”, at the same time he confirmed the right to freedom of speech.54 
The situation of atheists in the country is much worse, as they experience 
persecution at every step. There are cases of non-believer students being beaten up 
by classmates, to which the school, due to the increasing influence of fundamentalist 
Christian groups, does not respond.55 
Religion has played an important role in Georgia in the socialisation of chil-
dren.56 While developing a sense of religious belonging, children begin to perceive 
others (members of other churches, atheists) as enemies or individuals worse than 
the members of their own group – Georgians, followers of the Georgian Apostolic 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church. In the future this could lead to even greater 
divisions and antagonisms in the Georgian society. 
The Georgian Church does not hide its negative attitude towards other faiths 
in Georgia; it sees them as a threat to the religious identity of the nation. The 
higher clergy of the Georgian Church has undertaken various initiatives aimed 
at reducing the influence of other churches. According to some Georgians, “the 
Orthodox Church has pursued a Soviet policy towards these movements, and has 
52  Rada Europy o problemach mniejszości etnicznych i religijnych w Gruzji, Ośrodek Studiów 
Wschodnich, 12.10.2009, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl//publikacje/tydzień-na-wschodzie/2009- 
10-12/rada-europy-o-problemach-mniejszosci-etnicznych-i-religijnych-w-Gruzji (access: 13 April 
2015).
53  Dyskryminacja ateistów w Gruzji. Wpływy Cerkwi w interesie Rosji, 21 July 2015, http://onet.tv/i/
dowiedzsie/dyskryminacja-ateistow-w-gruzji-wplywy-cerkwi-w-interesie-rosji/3zdzlh (access: 
22 July 2015).
54  Georgia 2013 International Religious Freedom Report, Department of State USA, www.state.gov/
documents/organization/222429.pdf (access: 15 July 2015). 
55  Dyskryminacja ateistów w Gruzji. Wpływy Cerkwi w interesie Rosji, http://onet.tv/i/dowiedzsie/
dyskryminacja-ateistow-w-gruzji-wplywy-cerkwi-w-interesie-rosji/3zdzlh (access: 22 July 2015).
56  M.B. McGuire draws attention to his aspect of generating conflict in the work Religia w kon-
tekście społecznym, transl. S. Burdziej, Kraków, 2012, p. 259. 
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become a nationalistic institute. Going to church has become a political act for 
show. This religiousness boom has been connected to nationalism”.57
Religious extremists have not even hesitated to condemn the Catholicos for 
inviting, in 1999, the Pope to Georgia. Although the Catholicos met with John 
Paul II, he did not allow for religious and theological topics to be breached in the 
conversation, and the day after the meeting banned his followers from attending 
a Catholic mass held by the Holy Father in a Tbilisi sports hall. He motivated 
his decision with canons dating to the first centuries of Christianity, forbidding 
the faithful from attending services celebrated by heretics, in which the Georgian 
Church includes Catholics.58 The Georgian Church, along with a part of the 
society (mass protests of students who shouted the messages “we oppose a servile 
agreement with the Vatican”, “Georgia is Orthodox”), in 2003 advocated against 
the conclusion of an international agreement between Georgia and the Vatican. 
According to the Catholicos, the agreement would lead to tightening the relations 
between the Georgian Church and the Vatican, and would invite resentment 
from other religious denominations in Georgia.59 Although the agreement was to 
apply only to inter-state, rather than religious, issues, the Georgian Church began 
a vehement campaign against it, and Georgian clerics allegedly claimed in public 
that the agreement was unacceptable, as it in fact presumed the conversion of 
Georgia to Catholicism. The President E. Shevardnadze bowed to pressure exerted 
by the Georgian Church and suspended the signing of the agreement.60 
Preferential legal treatment and support from the authorities allowed the 
Georgian Church to rebuild its organisational structures.61 When recreating its 
former jurisdictions, the Georgian Church entered a dispute with other Churches 
and faiths. Five temples were taken away from the Catholics, of which three 
were in large cities (Kutaisi, Gori, Batumi), with tombstones being removed and 
Catholic writings destroyed inside.62 Georgia has had a dispute with Azerbaijan 
about the David Gareja monastic complex, which in 2009 was resolved by handing 
the control over the object to Georgia, and the land on which the monastery stands 
to Azerbaijan.63 The settlement of the case was only apparent. In the face of rumours 
spread in Georgia according to which Azeri border guards would not allow Georgian 
pilgrims and tourists into the grounds of the Udabno monastery within the David 
57  Zadura, Naród w tygrysiej skórze, p. 286.
58  Szef watykańskiej dyplomacji oburzony postawą Gruzji, Katolicka Agencja Informacyjna (KAI) 
21 September 2003, http://ekai.pl/wydarzenia/x5651/szef-watykanskiej-dyplomacji-oburzony-
postawa-gruzji (access: 25 June 2015).
59  Szyszlak, Stosunki państwa, p. 84.
60  Szef watykańskiej dyplomacji oburzony postawą Gruzji.
61  For more on this topic see: Nieczuja-Ostrowski, Religia w polityce, p. 297. 
62  Gruzin nie może być katolikiem.
63  A. Curanović, “Religie, Kościoły i konflikty międzywyznaniowe w regionie Kaukazu”, in: Arme-
nia, Azerbejdżan, Gruzja. Przeszłość i teraźniejszość, ed. M. Korzeniowski, D. Tarasiuk, K. Latawiec, 
Lublin, 2013, p. 212.
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Gareja complex (since Soviet times the Udabno monastery has been on Azerbaijan 
territory), in May 2012 the Georgian side began talks concerning its handover.64 
However, consensus requires concessions from both sides, which is not easy.
Most conflicts emerge between the Georgian Church and the Armenian Apostolic 
Church. Demands refer to a handover of several churches in the Samtskhe-Javakheti 
region as well as the control of medieval Armenian monasteries in Hokaret and 
Hustap, in Kvemo Kartli (Georgia) to Armenians. Various arguments have been 
used in the dispute, involving historians, art historians, ethnographers, employees 
of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, and representatives of both Churches.65 
Mutual relations between Armenians and Georgians are further complicated 
by the politics of the Georgian Church, which fills monasteries and churches in 
the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, dominated by Armenians,66 with Georgian clergy 
and nuns. This is a very dangerous policy, taking into account the strong sepa-
ratist aspirations of the local Armenians.67 Georgians received the first serious 
warning during the Russo-Georgian War. On 19 August 2008, Armenians from the 
Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli territories issued a declaration in favour of 
establishing a federal state in Georgia, where the territories inhabited by Armenians 
would become sovereign entities. It also demanded that the Armenian language 
be given the status of the state language.68 In February 2011 a meeting of the 
Armenians of Javakheti took place outside the Swiss Embassy in Moscow (rep-
resenting the interests of Georgia in Russia), in which they called for solving the 
problem of the status of the Georgian diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church, 
returning the taken Armenian temples, monasteries and historical monuments, 
securing equal rights and freedoms to all faith groups registered in Georgia, and 
complying with Chapter 19 of the Georgian Constitution.69 The foundation of the 
monumental Sameba temple – “the glory of the Georgian Orthodox Church”, built 
in the traditional Armenian district in Tbilisi on the site of the former Armenian 
64  Грузия ведет переговоры с Азербaйджаном о передаче монастыря Удабно входяего в комплекс 
Давид Гареджи, Православие.Ru, 15 December 2012, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/53516.
htm; Комплекс Давид Гареджи является клтурным памятником Грузии-Грузинский МИД, 
Православие.Ru, 16 December 2012, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/53559.htm (access: 
15 June 2015). 
65  Curanović, Religie, Kościoły, pp. 212–213; Kończak, Religia i konflikty, p. 169.
66  For more on the history of Armenians in Javakheti see В. Рамишвили, Армяно-Грузинский 
спор: Джавахети или Джавахк?, http://www.ca-c.org/c-g/2007/journal_rus/c-g-4/02.shtml 
(access: 1 July 2015); M. Marjanli, Armenians. Russia. The Caucasus, Dubai, 2011, pp. 46–55.
67  In March 1995, in the regions of Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe Armenians dismantled border 
posts and spoke out in favour of belonging to Armenia; К.С. Гаджиев, Кавказcкий узел 
в геополитических приоритетах Pоссии, Москва–Логос, 2010, p. 267.
68  В населенном армянами Самцхе – Джавахети поднят вопрос об автономии в составе 
Грузии, REGNUM –Информационное агентство, 22 August 2008, http://www.regnum.ru/
news/1043811.html#ixzz29rSJzn8C (access: 27 August 2015).
69  A. Токарев, Влияние государственности на эволюцию политических режимов Грузии 
и Украины в 1991–2014 годах, Москва, 2015, p. 215.
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cemetery70 was received very unfavourably. Churches which belonged to Armenians 
have been taken away and converted into Georgian Orthodox churches. In Tbilisi, 
Armenians demand the return of five of their former temples. This occasion is 
used to stigmatise the destruction of Armenian cemeteries located by the temples. 
The issue of temple ownership is currently the most serious allegation on the 
Armenian side against Georgians.71 The situation has been complicated even further 
by the decision of the Georgian Church from 6 February 2006 to create, under 
the authority of the Bishop of Dmanisi, a new Tashir-Agarak diocese, which is 
intended to renew the historical diocese of Kvemo Kartli. The problem lies in 
the fact that the established diocese includes the southern part of Armenia. The 
Armenian Apostolic Church emphasises that this decision has no legal basis, as 
the minimum number of the Georgian Church followers (one thousand) is not 
reached in this region. Moreover, the Georgian Church has requested the Armenian 
Apostolic Church to return six Georgian monasteries located in the historical 
district of Kvemo Kartli. In response, on 22 August 2007 one of the members of 
the Armenian Parliament proposed to create a separate diocese of the Armenian 
Apostolic Church in the town of Javakheti in southern Georgia, where Armenians 
represent 91–97% of the population.72 In 2011, The Armenian Church obtained 
a legal status in Georgia, while the Georgian Church has not yet been granted the 
same position in Armenia. The Georgian Church has laid claim to four monasteries 
in the Lori region, Akhtala, Kobayr, Hnevank and Huchap, as well as the monastery 
of Kirants, located in the Tavush region. The Armenian Church does not agree to 
it, giving two arguments as primary reasons – the historical Georgian monasteries 
active in the 11th–12th centuries were subject to the Armenian Apostolic Church 
and therefore this is how it should remain, and according to the official data73 
there are only 600 ethnic Georgians living in Armenia, which also speaks for 
keeping the current state.74 On the Javakheti territory, in several small towns and 
villages around Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe there are also Armenians Catholics, 
colloquially called “Franks”.75 They constitute a separate group in Georgia and 
are subject to the Ordinariate for Catholics of Armenian Rite in Eastern Europe, 
created in 1991 and since 2011 headed by Archbishop Raphaël Minassian.
70  Kończak, Religia i konflikty, p. 170.
71  I. Komoszyńska, “Niektóre aspekty współczesnych antagonizmów gruzińsko-ormiańskich”, in: 
Dylematy kaukaskie. Problemy narodowościowe i migracyjne, ed. M. Ząbek, Warszawa, 2010, 
p.  315; D. Zadura, Ormiańskie świątynie w Tbilisi, http://www.kaukaz.net/cgibin/blosxom.cgi/
polish/gruzja/gruzja_ormianskie_koscioly (access: 14 June 2015).
72  Curanović, Rosyjsko-kaukaskie sąsiedztwo, p. 385.
73  Data for 2011.
74  G. Abramian, Армения: Имущественные споры способствуют эскалации напряженности 
между церквями Армении и Грузии, 11 August 2011, Eurasianet.org http://russian.eurasianet.
org/node/58814 (access: 20 June 2015). 
75  Separate studies are being carried out regarding this group, e.g. in 2012 the project of the Viseg-
rad Foundation Franks – Armenian Catholics in Georgia. 
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In Adjara, following the end of the rule of Aslan Abashidze, the Georgian 
Church began a policy of emphasising the region’s Christian heritage. Adjara TV, 
controlled by the autonomy’s authorities, often broadcasts religious programmes 
prepared jointly with the patriarchate. However, there are no broadcasts addressed 
to Adjaran Muslims,76 who account for about 48% of the region’s population. 
Increasingly, many young Adjarans decide to convert to the Orthodox faith in 
order to become fully-fledged Georgians (e.g. to find work). This has definitely 
been influenced by representing the Muslim religion as an enemy which for mil-
lennia has been trying to destroy the Georgian nation. The fight against Islam is 
portrayed as a “war of civilisations”.77 The Georgian Church spends millions in 
public money on erecting churches and seminaries in Adjaran towns, and the local 
Orthodox clergy encourages the faithful to persuade their Muslim neighbours to 
change their religion.78 
The Georgian Church constantly opposes strengthening the position of 
Muslims in Georgia. The talks of 27 March 2013 between the head of Turkish 
diplomacy Ahmet Davutoğlu and Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, President 
of the Parliament David Usupashvili, Minister of Foreign Affairs Maia Panjikidze, 
Minister for Reintegration Paata Zakareishvili, and Catholicos Ilia II addressed 
the issue of repatriating Meskhetians and constructing a new mosque in Batumi. 
The latter case was met with numerous reservations from ecclesiastical authorities; 
nevertheless the Prime Minister announced his support.79
The Catholicos did not give his consent to the handover of religious buildings 
taken from the Armenian Apostolic Church in the Samtskhe–Javakheti region, 
inhabited mostly by Armenians, or to the construction of mosques for Muslims 
living in Adjara, which resulted in a shift of the religious disputes to the interstate 
level. This made it difficult for state authorities to pursue its foreign policies, 
especially as the Georgian Church has come forward with criticism of their actions. 
At the end of 2011, Ilia II sent a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, asking for the 
return of several churches in north-eastern Turkey,80 deeming it an injustice that 
while mosques are being rebuilt in Georgia, Georgian churches in Turkey are left 
76  More details on Muslims in Adjara in the work of Ruslan Baramidze, “Islam in Adjara – Com-
parative Analysis of Two Communities in Adjara”, in: Changing identities: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia. Collection of Selected Works, ed. V. Voronkov, Tbilisi, 2011, pp. 96–125.
77  P. Силантьев, “Религиозный фактор во внешнеполитических конфликтах на Кавказе”, in: 
Религия и конфликт, ed. А. Малашенко, С. Филатов, Москва, 2007, pp. 131–132; Kończak, 
Religia i konflikty, pp. 170–171; Curanović, Rosyjsko-kaukaskie sąsiedztwo, p. 384.
78  M. Koрсо, Грузия: Растёт дискриминация в отношении мусульман?, 7 September 2013, 
Eurasianet.org http://russian.eurasianet.org/node/60279 (access: 20 June 2015). 
79  W. Wojtasiewicz, “Wybory za pasem”, Nowa Europa Wschodnia (hereafter: NEW), 4 April 2013, 
www.new.org.pl/2013-04-04,wybory_za_pasem.html (access: 5 June 2015).
80  One of the features of Georgian monasticism is a centuries-old tradition in which monks travel 
across the border and establish monasteries in different locations, while at the same time they 
care for the preservation of their national character, J.M. Laboa, “Monastycyzm gruziński”, 
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in disrepair. Meanwhile, Georgian authorities, without waiting for a response to 
Catholicos, during his absence from the country expressed willingness to rebuild 
mosques in Georgia in exchange for restoring Orthodox churches in Turkey. In 
response to an initial agreement in which the governments of Georgia and Turkey 
discussed issues of mutual protection of religious objects,81 on 9 February 2012 
the Patriarchate of Georgia published its position, in which it accused Turkish 
authorities of conducting separate negotiations, and stressed that this is how 
conflicts between Muslims and Christians are provoked. A political warning for 
authorities was the so-called warning mass, organised in Batumi – a protest of 
Orthodox believers against the Georgian-Turkish agreement.82 However, the new 
government of Bidzina Ivanishvili decided to continue talks with Turkey about 
the protection of Muslim rights on Georgian territories. First talks regarding the 
construction of a new mosque in Batumi were opened by B. Ivanishvili during 
his trip to Turkey in February 2013, and then continued by the Turkish Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who arrived in Georgia a month later. The topic 
of restoring Georgian sacral buildings in the north-east of Turkey was also put 
forward, as was the complicated issue of repatriating Meskhetians.83 In August 
2014, Catholicos also began talks with Turkish authorities about obtaining legal 
status for the Georgian Church in Turkey, and the possibility of resuming activities 
in historical temples located in Turkey.84
After parliamentary elections in 2012, when the voice of conservative-nation-
alist groups became stronger, the temperature of conservative-nationalist moods 
increased as well. They manifested through riots which erupted on 26 August 2013 
in the south of the country in the village of Khela, inhabited by both Orthodox and 
Muslim Georgians, following the dismantling of the minaret of the Khela mosque 
by the local authorities. The reason for this was supposedly unlicensed construction 
in: Mnisi Wschodu i Zachodu. Historia monastycyzmu chrześcijańskiego, ed. J. M. Laboa, War-
szawa, 2009, p. 166.
81  These issues are also regulated by the constitutional agreement – article 10 contains the follow-
ing provision: “The State shall take responsibility to negotiate with other states on protection, 
care and management of all Georgian orthodox churches, monasteries and remains thereof, 
other ecclesiastical buildings, and ecclesiastical items being on their territories”, as well as their 
conservation and management, Constitutional Agreement between State of Georgia, p. 363. On 
17 July 2014, an agreement was signed between the state and the Georgian Church regarding 
joint protection of Georgia’s cultural heritage, Государство и Церковь в Грузии будут вместе 
сохранять культурное наследие, Образованне и Православие, 20 July 2014, http://www.
orthedu.ru/hppc/news-hppc/10797-gosudarstvo-i-cerkov-v-gruzii-budut-vmeste-sohranyat.html 
(access: 20 December 2015). 
82  Król-Mazur, Polityczne aspekty, p. 290.
83  W. Wojtasiewicz, “Polityka zagraniczna Republiki Gruzji pod rządami premiera Bidziny Iwan-
iszwilego – kontynuacja czy zmiana?”, in: Prawo i polityka na wschód od Europy, ed. J. Marszałek- 
-Kawa, P. Wawrzyński, Toruń, 2014, pp. 142–143.
84  Patriarch Ilia II asking Turkish authorities to resume services at Georgian churches, Tbilisi, 13 Sep-
tember 2014, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/english/73691.htm (access: 20 June 2015).
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and irregularities when bringing the minaret from Turkey. The government did 
not respond (although the Union of Georgian Muslims appealed to the Prime 
Minister Ivanishvili, asking him to intervene), and the tension was diffused as 
a result of mediation between Muslim communities and Ilia II.85 Catholicos stated 
that the forces which caused the confrontation between Christians and Muslims 
were aiming to discredit the Church and the state.86 However, acts against Muslims 
continue. In the town of Kobuleti in Adjara, Georgians protested against the 
construction of a Muslim school by hanging a pig’s head on its front door.87
The Georgian Prime Minister B. Ivanishvili, trying to dispel concerns about 
discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia, has repeatedly 
emphasised that Georgia is a tolerant country, and on 2 September 2013 assured 
representatives of the Muslim community in the presence of the diplomatic corps 
that “religious tolerance is not only our tradition, but also one of the basic principles 
of the Constitution of Georgia”.88 However, the reality is different, and the Georgian 
Church plays a big part in shaping it.
The overall situation is becoming increasingly dangerous, according to George 
Sanikidze, the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Ilia State University 
in Tbilisi, Muslims in Georgia also are experiencing a religious revival.89
According to a report drawn up in 2014 by the Human Right Watch organ-
isation, Muslims in Georgia are still subject to attacks from the Orthodox pop-
ulation. In regions where this group accounts for a considerable percentage of 
the population, they are not allowed to pray in homes converted to mosques. 
Various incidents occur, such as the one from April 2014, when in one of the 
villages in the region of Adjara three drunk police officers stopped cars, searched 
travellers, called them Tatars and demanded they show the crosses around their 
necks.90 As social conflicts are manifesting more frequently in Georgia, frictions 
between the Christian and Muslim population in this country are also on the rise.91 
Like the government, the Georgian Church also does not want the repatriation of 
85  M. Matusiak, “Wzrost nastrojów konserwatywno-nacjonalistycznych?”, Ośrodek Studiów Wschod-
nich, 4 September 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/publikacje/analizy/2013_09_04/gruzja-wz-
rost-nastrojow-konserwatywno-nacjonalistycznych (access: 4 June 2015). 
86  K. Kakachia, “Is Georgia’s Orthodox Church an Obstacle to European Values?”, PONARS Eur-
asia Policy Memo, no.  322, June 2014, p. 3, http://www.ponarseurasia.com/sites/default/files/
policy-memos-pdf/Pepm_332_Kakachia%20_June%202014.pdf (access: 20 December 2015).
87  Patriarch Ilia II asking Turkish authorities to resume services at Georgian churches, Tbilisi, 13 Sep-
tember 2014, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/english/73691.htm (access: 20 June 2015).
88  M. Koрсо, Грузия: Растёт дискриминация в отношении мусульман?, 7 September 2013, 
Eurasianet.org http://russian.eurasianet.org/node/60279 (access: 20 June 2015). 
89  Ibid.
90  Human Rights World Report 2014: Georgia, http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chap-
ters/georgia (access: 10 December 2015).
91  M. Falkowski, “Gruzja: kryzys polityczny i rosyjskie zagrożenie”, Analizy Ośrodka Studiów 
Wschodnich, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2014-11-19/gruzja-kryzys-poli-
tyczny-i-rosyjskie-zagrozenie (access: 10 December 2015).
133The role of the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church in conflicts in the South Caucasus
Meskhetian Turks on Samtskhe-Javakheti territories (the former does not want 
conflict with the Armenians who live there, and who have been settled there by 
the Russians in the place of Meskhetian Turks from mid-19th century, and the 
latter does not want any more Muslims in the country). Georgians have a neg-
ative attitude towards Meskhetian Turks and the government uses it, piling up 
obstacles for obtaining a repatriate status.92 Although in 2012 Georgia took on 
the responsibility of repatriating thousands of Meskhetians to Georgia,93 their 
situation did not change greatly. It is a priority for Georgia to ensure stability in 
Samtskhe–Javakheti region, as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan crude oil pipeline and 
the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline run through this area.
Information about discrimination against Muslims in Georgia raises concerns 
in neighbouring Muslim countries. In August 2013, the Catholicos received del-
egations of Iranian clergy, led by Ayatollah Shahritsan. The aim of the visit was 
to examine the situation of Muslims in the Caucasus and their relations with 
Christians. Using the opportunity, Ilia II appealed to Shahritsan not to enforce 
punishments on Georgians living in Iran for centuries for converting to Orthodox 
faith and returning to the religion of their ancestors.94 
Another problem has been the appointment of a joint committee, which is to 
take care of the most sensitive issues between Catholics and the Orthodox (e.g. the 
issue of churches that have been taken away, or recognising Catholic baptisms). 
Catholic signs and symbols are fought against – there have been cases where 
children who made the sign of the cross in the Catholic manner in school were 
hit across their palms. The Georgian Church has been very reluctant towards the 
activities of Caritas in Georgia run by the Catholic Church, because, in the words 
of Ilia II, “we are afraid of you, you are a large, rich, and well-organised Church, 
and we are a tiny one, recovering from the damages of communism. You are 
a threat to us”.95 Caritas is the only institution which helps hundreds of thousands 
of refugees, e.g. from South Ossetia, providing them with a modest daily meal. It 
works in difficult conditions, without funds, as the topic of refugees is undesirable 
in the media, since it gives the government a bad image.96
92  T. Trier, G. Tarkhan-Mouravi, F. Kilimnik, Meskhetian: Homeward Bound…, Tbilisi, 2011, 
pp. 42–47, 101; V. Modebadze, “Historical Background of Meskhetian Turks’ Problem and Major 
Obstacles to the Repatriation Process”, IBSU Scientific Journal, 3 (2009), no. 1, pp. 124–126. 
93  In 1999, the Georgian government committed itself to the repatriation and reintegration of 
Meskhetians within twelve years (it was a condition for Georgia’s membership in the Council 
of Europe). Cf. T. Pataraia, “Rozwój polityki migracyjnej w Gruzji”, in: Polityka migracyjna Gru-
zji: wnioski z polskich doświadczeń, ed. P. Kaźmierkiewicz, T. Pataraia, Warszawa, 2011, p. 117. 
94  Илия II попросил Иран не наказывать грузин, возвращающихся в Христианство, 21 August 
2013, Образование и Православие, http://www.orthedu.ru/news/7731-iliya-ii-poprosil-iran- 
ne-nakazyvat-gruzin-vozvrashhayushhixsya-v-xristianstvo.html (access: 25 June 2015).
95  Gruzin nie może być katolikiem.
96  A. Dzieduszycka-Manikowska, Dramat kościoła na Kaukazie, PCh24.pl, 4 August 2013, http://
www.pch24.pl/Mobile/Informacje/informacja/id/16759 (access: 12 August 2015).
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The Georgian Church, accused of religious chauvinism, has stood firmly behind 
maintaining its privileged position despite interventions from international organ-
isations and admonitions from the Council of Europe.97 The religious extremism 
guided by the Church was initially tolerated by the authorities. The situation 
partly changed after Mikheil Saakashvili rose to power. A fight with religious 
extremism had already started in the time of the Revolution of Roses, in the hope 
of winning over the Georgian intelligentsia. The authorities organised a propaganda 
and information campaign under the slogan “We celebrate Georgian diversity”,98 
which was supposed to remind the residents of Georgia of the traditional ethnic and 
religious tolerance in the country.99 The questions of religious freedom, inability to 
register religious groups and the spread of hate speech by Christian organisations 
and groups in Georgia in relation to people of different sexual orientation were 
repeatedly raised by successive ombudsmen in this country.100 However, their 
actions could not change a great deal, as the parliament often only received their 
reports without passing relevant acts.101 
Due to Georgia’s aspirations for accession to the European Union, its authori-
ties were forced to take steps and decisions at odds with the position and activities 
of the Georgian Church. The government of M. Saakashvili took actions aimed to 
stop the activities of people explicitly committing violence against religious minor-
ities – for example, the previously excommunicated by the Georgian Patriarchate 
fanatical priest Basil Mkalavishvili.102 Importantly, in a study conducted in 2003 the 
activities of Mkalavishvili were seen as “positive” by 45.2 per cent of respondents.103 
The position of the Georgian Church wavered on 6 July 2011, when a law 
changing the status of religious minorities in Georgia entered into force – until then, 
97  In April 2011, The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe expressed concern in its 
resolution about the legal situation of minorities, stressing “the lack of adequate legal status 
and legal protection for groups and faiths other than GOC [Georgian Orthodox Church]”; Rada 
Europy chwali Gruzję. Cerkiew protestuje, http://www.kaukaz.info/rada-europy-chwali-gruz-
je-cerkiew-protestuje.html (access: 29 June 2014). 
98  Tbilisi is compared to Jerusalem – it is a meeting point of different cultures, nations and reli-
gions. Within the city you can find a Muslim mosque, a Jewish synagogue, an Armenian church, 
a Catholic Church – called a Polish Church, a Russian Orthodox Church, Lutheran and Baptist 
Church. It is a home to more than 90 nations and ethnic groups; D. Parzymies, Życie codzienne 
w Tbilisi 1999–2003, Warszawa, 2004, pp. 37–44, 93–119.
99  Kończak, Religia i konflikty, p. 169.
100  M. Wróblewski, “Partnerstwo na rzecz praw człowieka. Współpraca z Ombudsmanem Gruzji 
w ramach programu ombudsmanów państw Partnerstwa Wschodniego UE”, in: Gruzja między 
Wschodem a Zachodem, ed. K. Masiuk et al., Kraków–Warszawa, 2012, p. 108.
101  In 2007, the parliament rejected the official opportunity to have Sozar Subari present the annual 
report; L. Leszczenko, Instytucja ombudsmana w państwach proradzieckich. Geneza – status 
prawny – rozwój, Warszawa, 2011, p. 127. 
102  A. Szabaciuk, “Między konfliktem a pokojem. Polityka etniczna i wyznaniowa Gruzji w latach 
1991–2012”, Wschodnioznawstwo, 2012, pp. 68–69.
103  The Political Landscape of Georgia, p. 72.
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they had been considered non-commercial entities of private law. The first attempts 
to level the legal status of the Georgian Church and other religious communities 
were made in December 2005, however some members of the Georgian parliament 
thwarted them by not taking part in the vote.104 The act of 2011 enabled the 
Armenian Apostolic Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Evangelical Baptist 
Church, as well as Muslim and Jewish groups to register as public law entities. These 
changes were very strongly criticised by the Patriarchate, which even decided to 
take its followers to the streets. Several thousand people protested against the new 
legal regulation outside the parliament, led by Orthodox priests. Protest marches 
were held on 9, 10 and 11 July. Catholicos Ilia II blessed the crowd of protesters, 
and in the first issued statement stated that the passed law threatened the Georgian 
Church’s special position, and that giving other religions in Georgia legal status 
should take place once the Georgian Church has received it in other countries 
(especially Armenia). He also addressed the government in an angry statement, 
saying that in accepting such a law it humiliated the Georgian Church.105 He stated 
that “this law is important, but also very dangerous, so the legislators should think 
over what consequences it may have within ten or a hundred years…”.106 The 
Christian-Democratic Movement began collecting signatures to officially recognise 
Orthodox Christianity as the state religion.107 
From the perspective of the ruling camp, the new regulation was likely to 
improve relations with national minorities, in particular the Armenians residing 
in dense clusters in the south of the country, poorly integrated with the rest of 
the country, and constantly accused of separatism. The Georgian Church “led” 
the mass protests against the law, fearing property claims from the Armenian 
Church (before 1917, there were between 457 and 600 Armenian temples and 
monasteries on the territory of Georgia, according to various sources). This is also 
confirmed by the behaviour of the enraged Georgian believers who on 10 July 2011 
attacked several Armenians on the Ketevan Tsamebuli square in Tbilisi and beat 
them severely. Arnold Stepanian, the head of the Armenian Community of Tbilisi 
declared that the fuss around the act of 6 July contributed to increased hostility 
towards Armenians, and that Armenophobia was awakening in Georgia. The 
authoritative bishop Zenon of Dmanisi, in his speech broadcast by the Maestro 
radio station on 7 July, pointed to the Armenian Apostolic Church and Armenian 
104  Curanović, Rosyjsko-kaukaskie sąsiedztwo, p. 383.
105  W. Wojtasiewicz, “’Wojna religijna’ i afera szpiegowska w Gruzji”, NEW, 18 July 2011, www.
new.org.pl/2011-07-18,wojna_religijna_i_afera_szpiegowska_w_gruzji.html (access: 20 July 2014); 
В. Мальцев, Илия II: “Не унижайте Церковь!” Масштабные протесты православных 
верующих заставили власти Грузии свернуть с европейского пути, http://www.religare.
ru/2_87652.html (access: 26 June 2015).
106  Cerkiew protestuje przeciwko nowemu prawu, http://www.kaukaz.info/cerkiew-protestuje-przeci-
wko-nowemu-prawu.html (access: 29 June 2014). 
107  Мальцев, Илия II.
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authorities as those mainly responsible for passing the above mentioned law by 
the Georgian parliament.108 
On 12 July 2011, the Georgian parliament introduced amendments to the 
already approved law. Politicians of the ruling party reassured the Patriarchate, 
through the words of Nugzar Tsiklauri, that the Georgian Church would retain 
a special status guaranteeing it certain fiscal privileges.109 And so in the budget for 
2014 25 million lari (approximately 14.4 million dollars) was allocated to subsidies 
for the Georgian Church.110 
The Catholicos vehemently opposed the ratification by the Georgian Parliament 
of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which guarantees 
national minorities the right to use one’s own language. Georgia committed itself to 
ratifying it already in 1999. In a statement the Patriarchate said that this document 
would contribute to the development of separatist tendencies in Georgia, and 
would reduce the chances of restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity.111
The Georgian Church also represents a radical position in terms of granting 
equal rights to sexual minorities, as in the case of the bloody events of 17 May 
2013. Orthodox clergy took active part in the violent mass protests organised in 
Tbilisi against the demonstration of gay rights defenders.112 While the events were 
taking place, the police remained utterly passive.113 The Patriarchate of Georgia 
plays a considerable role in strengthening the homophobic attitudes of a huge 
part of the Georgian society.114 According to research carried out in 2013 by 
the Caucasus Resource Research Centre, a significant number of Georgians is 
willing to respect religious minorities, but will never accept sexual minorities, as 
108  Ibid.
109  Ibid.; Г. Двали, “Грузия отделилась от церкви”, Коммерсанть, 7 July 2011; Ormianie w Gru-
zji, http://www.fundacjaormiańska.pl/ormianie-w-gruzji/ (access: 20 July 2015); Gruzińska Cer-
kiew krytykuje nowe przepisy, http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1356,title,Gruzinska-Cerkiew-
krytykuje-nowe-przepisy,wid,13573623,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=112548 (access: 20 July 2015).
110  Грузия профинансируeт Грузинскую Православную Церковь в размере 25 миллионов лари, 
Православие.Ru, 8 October 2013, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/64750.htm (access: 16 Decem-
ber 2015).
111  M. Tauber, Geopolityka, sytuacja wewnętrzna w Gruzji, a stanowisko Gruzińskiej Cerkwi Pra-
wosławnej, 22 April 2013, www.forum-ekonomiczne.pl/article/geopolityka-sytuacja-wewnętrzna-
w-gruzji-a-stanowisko-gruzinskiej-cerkwi-prawoslawnej/# (access: 12 January 2015).
112  Król-Mazur, Polityczne aspekty, p. 293.
113  In Georgia, human rights protection is the domain of i.a. one of the structural links of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs – the Patrol Police, see M. Marsagiszwili, “Działalność Departamentu 
Policji Patrolowej Gruzji. Prawa Człowieka”, in: Polsko-gruzińska wymiana doświadczeń 
w zakresie podejmowania czynności służbowych przez funkcjonariuszy policji w aspekcie praw 
i wolności człowieka, ed. I. Nowicka, T. Mosio, Szczytno, 2008, pp. 31–34. 
114  Human Rights World Report 2014: Georgia, http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/coun-
try-chapters/georgia (access: 10 December 2015); The Georgian Authorities should not water 
down the country’s first anti-discrimination bill, Amnesty International Public Statement, 
24 April 2014, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur56/001/2014/en/ (access: 20 Decem-
ber 2015).
137The role of the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church in conflicts in the South Caucasus
they attack their national dignity and offend Christian values.115 By radicalising 
the sentiments of the Georgian society, the Georgian Church has contributed to 
the rise of radical religious groups – such as The Orthodox Union or Christian 
Parents, which played a decisive role in the 2012 clashes.116 In April 2014, the 
Georgian Church strongly expressed its opposition to the government’s bill to 
eliminate all forms of discrimination, opposing the provision for legal protection 
against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity.117 
In the last years of the government of M. Saakashvili and his United National 
Movement in particular, the Georgian Church very clearly showed a critical attitude 
to its pro-Western policies (accepting the standards for the protection of different 
minorities, including sexual minorities), perceiving them as dangerous to tradi-
tion, and claiming that the West is a greater threat to Georgia than Russia. This 
conviction is present among a large part of the Georgian clergy to this day. Ilia II 
has often (for example in 2014 New Year’s wishes) urged the European Union to 
take into account the aspirations of Georgia to maintain the country’s traditional 
values and not to impose “same-sex marriages or same-sex family ideals, alien to 
the Georgian nation”.118 The anti-Western attitude of the Georgian Church might 
strengthen in the future, as the European Union and the United States of America 
provide all sorts of support also to religious minorities, including granting funds 
for this purpose.119 
 The Georgian Church has also criticised emigration of its followers, who are 
leaving their native country in increasing numbers, and is also reluctant towards 
the influx of immigrants to Georgia. The Catholicos speaks out against the sale 
of land to foreigners – in his view, this poses a threat to the existence of the 
Georgian state. Ilia II calls on the country’s authorities to suspend the process of 
selling Georgian land to citizens of foreign countries in order to attract foreign 
capital to Georgia. He stresses that Georgian land should not be sold to foreigners, 
and that Georgians should not support foreign employees.120 We should also 
bear in mind that Georgia is a shelter for Chechen refugees (where 0.7% of its 
immigrants come from),121 who, being Muslims, are not welcomed by the Georgian 
115  A. Chanadiri, Gruzini. Zagubieni Europejczycy, 14 December 2013, http://zw.lt/opinie/gru zini-
zagubieni-europejczyzy/ (access: 9 July 2015).
116  Kakachia, Is Georgia’s Orthodox Church, p. 3.
117  Ibid., p. 5.
118  Król-Mazur, Polityczne aspekty, p. 294.
119  The US Embassy gives grants to local non-governmental organisations to support religious and 
legal aid for religious minorities, Georgia 2013 International Religious Freedom Report, Depart-
ment of State USA, 28 July 2014, p. 11, www.state.gov/documents/organization/222429.pdf 
(access: 15 July 2015). 
120  Патриархи Грузии: Продажа земли инoстраицам ставит под удaр сущетвование 
гoсудaрста, Православие.Ru, 14 July 2014, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/71975.htm (access: 
16 December 2015). 
121  Pataraia, Rozwój polityki migracyjnej, p. 114.
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Church. Their presence is also a reason for grievances on the part of the Russian 
Federation. 
The increase of social conflicts in Georgia has been fuelled by the Georgian 
Church’s involvement in shaping historical policy – it actively participates in the 
creation of school curricula (state schools teach history of religion122), in an attempt 
to control the work of research centres,123 public television and radio. It stands up 
for television stations broadcasting content in line with the Church’s teachings.124 
The Catholicate also has its own media – the newspaper Grapevine Cross and the 
radio station Iveria.125 Ilia II is a supporter of introducing censorship, which he 
expressed at the presentation of a book by Erekle Deisadze, Saidumlo Siroba, 
which caused a scandal in Georgia due to its provocative and offensive content. 
The Patriarch deemed this publication a manifestation of the battle against the 
Church and traditional Georgian values, and decorated one of the clerical leaders 
of a religious organisation who actively participated in the fight which took place 
during a televised debate about the book.126 
The constitutional agreement is proof that politicians have noticed the 
importance of religious issues. Georgian politicians very often refer to religious 
signs, combining them with national symbols. The importance of the national 
Church is even clearer to the successive political leaders, beginning with Eduard 
Shevardnadze. The Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Garibashvili publicly proclaims 
that the entire history of Georgia is based on Christian faith. He emphasises the 
role of the Georgian Church and expresses gratitude to the Catholicos for his work 
to unify and strengthen the country.127
The trust Georgians place in the head of their Church has not changed for 
many years. He continues to top popularity rankings – in April 2014 he received 
support of 96%.128 Unfortunately, with age he begins to lose some control over 
the happenings within the Church – ultraconservative clergy is gaining more and 
more power. As some Georgian clerics admit, the growth of radical tendencies in 
the Orthodox Church in Georgia is boosted to a large extent by the lack of compe-
tence in the clergy – over the last forty years, the number of priests has increased 
122  Król-Mazur, Polityczne aspekty, p. 296.
123  The Catholicos even intended to build a hotel by the Church of the Holy Trinity, in which he 
could hold several-day meetings with Georgian intellectuals; ibid. 
124  Such a situation took place in June 2013, see საპატრიარქოს ტელევიზია “ერთსულოვნების“ 
კერძო სამაუწყებლო სიხშირის გათიშვის გამო 14 June 2013, http://www.patriarchate.
ge/?action=news_show&mode=news&id=765 (accessed 4 June 2015).
125  Król-Mazur, Polityczne aspekty, p. 296.
126  D. Zadura, Liberalna demokracja i prawosławny dżihad w Gruzji, 21 September 2010, www.psz.
pltekst-33917/Liberalna-demokracja-i-prawoslawny-dzihad-w-Gruzji (access: 20 June 2015). 
127  Премьер-министр Грузии: Вся наша история зиждется на христянскoй вере, Православие.
Ru, 15 December 2014, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/70715.htm (access: 16 December 2015).
128  Public Attitudes in Georgia: Results of an April 2014 Survey, https://www.ndi.org/files/Geor-
gia-April14-Survey-Political-English.pdf (access: 20 June 2015).
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thirty-four times, but not all of them have received a good theological education. 
It is these clerics who are more likely to promote and support ultraconservative 
movements within the Georgian Church. Taking into account the influence of 
the Catholicos and the Georgian Patriarchate on the formation of public opinion, 
the situation described above can have far-reaching consequences for internal and 
foreign policy of Georgia.129 
Despite reluctance to accept other faiths, the Georgian Church has favourably 
referred to the government decree issued on 7 February 2014 on the establishment 
of an agency which is to pay compensation for damages suffered in Georgia by 
religious organisations during the Soviet regime.130 Compensation and subsidies 
from the state budget are to be received by, apart from the Georgian Church, four 
other religious communities: Muslim, Armenian, Catholic and Jewish. The Prime 
Minister Irakli Garibashvili, who in this way wants to settle relations between the 
state and religious associations, said that the funds would be allocated in proportion 
to the number of the believers.131
The act of the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Georgia from 4 June 
2014 serves as a guarantee of its interests and is a complement to the constitutional 
agreement. It stipulates e.g. the appointment of a bilateral committee tasked with 
describing church monuments and religious objects kept in store of Georgian 
museums, and to present a report on their condition. The Georgian Church, 
working closely with the Ministry of Culture, is to look after the ownership and 
safety of the cultural heritage of the Church, both in Georgia and abroad. All 
Georgian parishes operating outside the country will establish Georgian spiritual 
centres and Sunday schools. The Patriarchate together with the Theological 
Academy is to be responsible for the preparation of curricula and textbooks for the 
Sunday schools. In order to recover its administrative structures and staff parishes 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Church has decided to request assistance 
from international organizations and government agencies, working as groups 
for a Russian-Georgian dialogue. The Holy Synod has voiced its opposition to the 
anti-discrimination law, unacceptable to the Georgian Church, and expressed the 
hope that in the near future this law would be changed.132
According to the data in the International Religious Freedom Report for 
2013, there are still many cases in which this law is violated in Georgia. Only the 
129  M. Koрсо, Грузия: Православная церковь может превратиться в очаг нетерпимости?, 
26 June 2013, Eurasianet.org, https://russian.eurasianet.org/node/60169 (access: 20 June 2015).
130  The decision was announced by the authorities already on 27 January 2014, საქართველოს 
საპატრიარქოს განცხადება, 27 January 2014, http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=news_
show&mode=news&id=789 (access: 22 June 2015). 
131  “Gruzja: władze zamierzają finansować Kościół katolicki”, Niedziela, 27 January 2014, http://
www.niedziela.pl/artykul/7723/Gruzja-wladze-zamierzaja-finansowac (access: 22 June 2015).
132  Обнародовано постановление Священного Синода Грузинской Православной Церкви, 6 June 
2014, Образование и Православие, http://www.orthedu.ru/hppc/news-hppc/10448-14.html 
(access: 25 June 2015).
140 Renata Król-Mazur
Georgian Church is financed from the state budget, and it is also exempt from 
most taxes. Religious education in school, overseen by the Georgian Church, 
cannot be controlled by school authorities. The Georgian Church receives pref-
erential treatment from the government in the financing of temple restoration. 
Other churches, including the Roman Catholic Church and the Armenian 
Apostolic Church, have complained that disputes about ownership have not 
been resolved on the basis of a transparent legal process, but on a case-by-case 
basis, clearly favouring the claims of the Georgian Church. Unsolved disputes 
regarding the belonging of various religious buildings to specific Churches, and 
dragging the situation out are conducive to the rise of conflicts between individual 
faith groups, and cause the contentious historic buildings to fall into disrepair. 
Representatives of other religions have complained about the inability to recover 
some of their buildings from the government, as they have been registered as 
objects of cultural heritage – such talks have been conducted by the government, 
with the support of the Georgian Church, with the Jewish community in Tbilisi, 
Gori, and Batumi. The Ombudsman continues to receive numerous complaints 
from Jehovah’s Witnesses (33 in 2013), as well as from Muslims, followers of the 
Armenian Apostolic Church, the Pentecostal Church, Adventists, and Evangelicals. 
The Ombudsman has also raised the issue of promoting the principles proclaimed 
by the Georgian Church by teachers, and using religious emblems in lessons. 
Members of religious minorities are afraid to report abuse committed in schools 
to the appropriate Ministry of Education department, fearing that teachers would 
retaliate on children, and feeling that their actions would not be effective. Another 
example of not respecting religious freedom in Georgian schools is setting exam 
dates on Saturdays, which is at odds with the religious principles of Jews and 
Adventists. The report also lists specific examples of abuse faced by representatives 
of the Georgian society due to their affiliation with other religious associations. Ilia 
II commented on the reports of not respecting religious freedom in Georgia with 
a statement, widely quoted in the media, that these days “the majority is often more 
oppressed” than minorities.133
As if attempting to compensate for all of this to other religions and Churches, 
the government participates in a variety of celebrations they organise. The Prime 
Minister B. Ivanishvili greeted the Catholics at Easter and ate iftar with Muslim 
leaders during Ramadan. The National Library organised celebrations of the 
International Holocaust Remembrance Day. The Ministry of Defence has started 
educating Georgian armed forces taking part in international operations about 
religious sensitivity issues – the battalion involved in the Afghanistan mission 
has been taught history, tradition and principles of Islam. By the end of 2013, 
the Government registered 22 minority religious groups as public law entities, 
133  Georgia 2013 International Religious Freedom Report, Department of State USA, 28 July 2014, 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/222429.pdf (access: 15 July 2015). 
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including three Catholic Church groups, four Muslim ones, one Lutheran, one 
Yazidi, and two Jewish groups.134 
The Georgian Church has also shown pro-peace activities, in an effort to 
alleviate the conflict between Georgia and Russia. Since the dissolution of the 
USSR, the Georgian Church and the Russian Orthodox Church have made efforts 
for good cooperation. They offered each other support in the time of internal 
schisms experienced by both Churches in the 1990s. They also consistently boycott 
schismatic communities. Both the Georgian Church and the Russian Orthodox 
Church are very distrustful towards the Vatican and the ecumenical trend. On 
20 May 1997 the Georgian Church withdrew from the World Council of Churches 
and the Conference of European Churches, whose member it had been since 
1962.135 Representatives of the Georgian Patriarchate actively join celebrations 
organised by the Moscow Patriarchate. In August 2013, Ilia II took part in the 
1025th anniversary of the baptism of Rus’. In February 2014, a Georgian Patriarchate 
delegation participated in celebrations taking place in the Donskoy Monastery in 
Moscow, where underground crypts are the place of burial of Georgian clerics, 
nobles, and members of the royal dynasty of Imereti. The main purpose of the 
visit was to collect an icon of Saint Sergei, created at the School of Icon Painting at 
the Moscow Theological Academy. The icon is to be placed in the Georgian Saint 
Gregory monastery in Alaverdi, in the province of Lori in northern Armenia.136
Relations between the Georgian Church and the Russian Orthodox Church are 
complicated by the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Abkhazia, parallel to the 
political conflict, there has been an ongoing conflict between Abkhazian parishes 
which wanted to become independent from Georgia and move to the jurisdiction of 
the Moscow Patriarchate. The Georgian Church considers the Abkhazian eparchy 
(or diocese) as part of its canonical area.137 The Russian Orthodox Church has 
concluded that they form a part of the Georgian Church’s territory. However, it 
has not prevented it from exercising informal care over the Abkhazian parishes. 
On behalf of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Orthodox Abkhazians are overseen by 
bishop Panteleimon Maykovsky. A commotion in the Georgian Church was caused 
on 9 January 2007 by the presentation of an Abkhazian translation of the New 
Testament in Moscow, and a decision to give a copy of the translation to Orthodox 
parishes in Sukhumi. The Georgian Church accuses the Russian Orthodox Church 
of training Abkhazian clergy in the Moscow Theological Seminary, supplying them 
with religious literature and liturgical objects, and carrying out activities contrary to 
134  Ibid.
135  Król-Mazur, Polityczne aspekty, p. 299.
136  Московский Патриархат принимает делегацию Грузинской Православной Церкви, 13 Feb-
ruary 2014, Образование и Православие, http://www.orthedu.ru/newОбразование и  Пра-
вославиеs/9388-14.html (access: 25 June 2015).
137  Before taking office of the Catholicos – Patriarch of All Georgia, Ilia II was the archbishop of 
Sukhumi-Abkhazia. 
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the canon law by the clergymen of the Moscow Patriarchate. Also, the presence of 
the Bishop of Stavropol and Vladikavkaz, Feofan, caused outrage at the swearing-in 
ceremony of the president of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, not recognised by 
the Georgian authorities. The Georgian Church did not accept the decision of the 
Abkhazian Orthodox Church about its independence from Georgia, announced in 
September 2009.138 At the same time, the Moscow Patriarchate declared its respect 
for the existing borders of the jurisdiction of the Georgian Church. The Patriarch 
of Constantinople took a similar stand.139 However, the local church in Abkhazia 
takes various efforts to remove all of the past associations with the Georgian 
Church, e.g. by modifying architecture to eliminate all Georgian characteristics.140 
A rebellious community in South Ossetia, centred around Father Alexander 
(Georgy Pukhaiev), has called to join the Russian Orthodox Church. Since 
the  Russian Orthodox Church refused, at first a decision was made to pass 
under  the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, then to 
create the Diocese of South Ossetia – Alania. The Moscow Patriarchate also in this 
case did not accept the decision to become independent from Georgia.141
However, it should be noted that the cause of the civil war in Georgia 
(1992–1994) was the deeply rooted nationalism among Georgians, Abkhazians 
and Ossetians, and religion became one of the important components of identity 
for the feuding nations. 
The events of August 2008 became the test of the relationship between the 
Georgian Church and the Russian Orthodox Church. Catholicos Ilia II deplored 
the conflict between the two Orthodox countries,142 but emphasised that it did not 
have a religious dimension, but that its causes were global and political, and that 
Georgia had become the battlefield for world powers and forces. The statement 
of the Ossetian bishop George was a reference to the political choices of Georgia 
(accession to NATO, training of Georgian soldiers by the Turkish military), as 
in a letter to the Catholicos he lamented the fact that experiences of joint fight 
against “Muslim invaders” had been forgotten, and that “Georgia now took 
Islamic Turkey for an ally […] ‘learning from their instructors how to kill brothers 
138  Curanović, Rosyjsko-kaukaskie sąsiedztwo, pp.  389–390; Król-Mazur, Polityczne aspekty, 
p. 300.
139  G. Hewitt, Discordant Neighbours: A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South 
Ossetian Conflicts, Leiden, 2013, pp.  284–285; Moscow Patriarchate shall not encourage the 
separation of the Abkhaz Diocese from Georgian Church, 16 September 2009, http://www.inter-
fax-religion.com/?act=news&div=6445 (access: 22 June 2015).
140  Georgia 2013 International Religious Freedom Report, Department of State USA, 28 July 2014, 
p. 8, www.state.gov/documents/organization/222429.pdf (access: 15 July 2015). 
141  Król-Mazur, Polityczne aspekty, p. 300.
142  Interestingly, there have been statements in the Polish media showing solidarity with Georgia 
due to the fact that it is “a Christian country”, but overlooking the fact that the war was con-
ducted between two Christian nations, M. Domagała, Percepcja konfliktu kaukaskiego w polskich 
mediach w 2008 r., Warszawa, 2014, pp. 371–372.
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in faith’”.143 Ilia II not only urged everyone to “stop the armed conflict”, but also 
reminded both nations that they were bound by a centuries-old friendship, family 
ties, and Christian faith.144
The traditional close ties with the Russian Orthodox Church facilitated the 
Georgian Church’s involvement in mediation between Georgia and Russia, which 
played a crucial role during the Russo-Georgian War. The Catholicos visited the 
Russian war zone and personally negotiated with the Russian military command 
on the issue of taking the bodies of Georgian soldiers.145
The Georgian Church tried to silence the growing prejudices, maintaining, 
especially after the war of 2008, the officially non-existent diplomatic relations. The 
Catholicos intervened immediately after the start of the fighting, sending a letter to 
the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. 
He conducted a telephone conversation with Metropolitan Kirill, the head of the 
Department for External Ecclesiastical Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate. Ilia 
II also asked the Russian President not to approve Duma’s provision on the independ-
ence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.146 Both patriarchates (Georgian and Russian) 
organised humanitarian aid for the inhabitants of the war-affected regions.147
Nevertheless, Ilia II always stresses that Abkhazia and South Ossetia, “are 
traditional Georgian lands”.148 Therefore, he instantly reacted to the wishes sent 
by the Patriarch of Moscow, Kirill, to the people of South Ossetia on the twentieth 
anniversary of “independence”. He issued a letter to the Patriarch, in which he 
wrote that the step was incomprehensible, as by it Kirill “recognises the separatist 
regime established by violence, against the law, on land which for centuries has 
been Georgian”. He deplored Kirill’s statement, noting that “the Church should 
not be influenced by politicians and political processes”. He also expressed his 
belief that the Moscow Patriarchate would, as it had in the past, show concern 
for the canonical borders of the Georgian Orthodox Church.149 
Ilia II enjoys respect in Moscow, of which the best proof was the award, 
presented to him on 21 January 2013, by the International Foundation for the 
143  Ibid., p. 368.
144  Ibid.
145  Патриарх Илия II: были братьями и останемся братьями, 10 August 2013, Образование 
и Православие, http://www.orthedu.ru/news/7667-patriarx-iliya-ii-byli-bratyami-i-ostanem-
sya-bratyami.html (access: 26 June 2015).
146  Król-Mazur, Polityczne aspekty, p. 301.
147  J. Ćwiek-Karpowicz, “Cerkiew prawosławna w polityce zagranicznej Rosji”, Biuletyn PISM, 
9 August 2010, no. 110 (718), p. 2281, http://www.pism.pl/zalaczniki/Biuletyn_718_3.pdf. (access: 
20 July 2015).
148  Eliasz II Patriarcha Gruzji, http://edu.gazeta.pl/edu/h/Eliasz+II+%28patriarch+Gruzja%29#Dzia.
C5.82alno.C5.9B.C4.87_w_Gruzji (access: 22 June 2015). 
149  Rosyjsko-gruziński konflikt prawosławny, Radio Watykańskie, 27 September 2010, http://www.
deon.pl/religia/kosciol-i-swiat/z-zycia-kosciola/art,3191,rosyjsko-gruzinski-konflikt-prawoslawny.
html (access: 16 December 2015).
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Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations “for special merits in the work of strength-
ening the fraternal ties between the Orthodox nations and Churches”.150 The 
Catholicos then met with the President Vladimir Putin, passing on greetings from 
the new Prime Minister B. Ivanishvili.151 Ilia II is one of the few representatives 
of Georgia who can easily travel from Georgia to the Russian Federation, and the 
only one who  has officially met with the highest representatives of the Russian 
state, including Vladimir Putin, leading negotiations on the most important issues 
for the interests of Georgia.152 In interviews Ilia II emphasises that he loves Russia 
and its culture, and the period of study spent at the seminary in Russia allowed 
him to understand the Russian character.153
Some political scientists believe that the pro-Western course adopted by 
Georgian authorities, about which the Georgian Church is increasingly unhappy, 
has been the cause of strengthening the relationship between the local Church 
and the Patriarchate of Moscow. Kornely Kakachia believes that since the war of 
2008 Russia has been trying milder methods of restoring its influence in Georgia 
– reminding it of their common history through the Orthodox Church and reli-
gion.154 For the Moscow Patriarchate it is important to regulate the situation in 
Abkhazia, where there has been further division (including young priests affiliated 
with the New Athos monastery wanting greater consideration for Abkhazia’s own, 
Christian tradition and independence from Russian Orthodox Church).155
The Georgian authorities face problems due to some of the Catholicos’ public 
statements in which he speaks about the international situation, especially if they 
relate to its closest neighbours. An example may be the words spoken to Azeri clergy 
who participated in the concert held on the eightieth birthday of the head of the 
Georgian Church: “Karabakh belongs and will belong to Azerbaijan”.156 Officially, 
the Georgian government takes a neutral stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
stressing the need for a peaceful solution – this was also the position of the Prime 
Minister B. Ivanishvili, when in January 2013 he paid a visit to Armenia.157
Analysing the relationship between religion and politics in Georgia, we can 
see that national identity is based on self-identification with religion (we can see 
150  Do Rosji przybywa Katolikos-Patriarcha Gruzji Eliasz II, 20 January 2013, http://polish.ruvr.
ru/2013_01_21/Do_Rosji_przybywa_Katolikos_Patriarcha_Gruzji_Eliasz_II (access: 22 July 2015). 
151  K. Zasztowt, “Georgian Dream’s Foreign Policies: An Attempt to Change the Paradigm?”, The 
Polish Institute of International Affairs Policy Paper, 3(51) (2013), p. 4. 
152  Патриарх Илия II: были братьями и останемся братьями, 10 August 2013.
153  Ibid.
154  Dyskryminacja ateistów w Gruzji. Wpływy Cerkwi w interesie Rosji, 21 July 2015, http://onet.
tv/i/dowiedzsie/dyskryminacja-ateistow-w-gruzji-wplywy-cerkwi-w-interesie-rosji/3zdzlh 
(accessed 22 July 2015).
155  Curanović, Religie, Kościoły i konflikty, p. 219.
156  Katolikos Eliasz II: Abchazja i Osetia Południowa przynależą do Gruzji.
157  Wojtasiewicz, Polityka zagraniczna Republiki Gruzji, p. 142.
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it clearly on the example of non-Georgian communities, which have lived in 
Georgia for generations and speak the local language, but are treated as “foreign” 
because of their “non-Orthodox” and therefore “non-Georgian” faith), which 
unfortunately leads to negative consequences as the area of politics intentionally 
(or unintentionally) uses it to achieve its own goals. Religion is perceived as an 
important element of national tradition, and the return to tradition is a char-
acteristic of most post-Soviet societies. For the ruling elite it is also beneficial 
because they can use the argument of tradition to fend off allegations about a lack 
of systemic reforms.158 Religion has been instrumentalised and used to achieve 
current political goals. At the same time, the Georgian Church “enters politics” 
engaging in activities closely linked to broadly understood politics. The political 
power manifests its far-reaching concern about religious matters, which encourages 
the Georgian Church to support such authorities. We can even venture to say that 
for some time there was a situation in Georgia in which politics served religion. 
We could say that the conduct of the Georgian Church confirms the thesis of 
Patrick Michel that “religion, contrary to its official mission of proclaiming the 
universal, is used primarily to express – and justify – the particular […]. Instead 
of becoming a place to resolve tensions and conflicts, religion, by supporting and 
affirming the construction of nationalistic identity, becomes a place of exclusion 
of the other”.159 In Georgia, the rivalry between the state and the Georgian Church 
in the use of religion for political and ideological purposes to mobilise the society 
is clearly visible.160 We could say that there is a temptation in this country to 
transform politics into a religion, and religion into politics. The clergy are involved 
(either directly or indirectly) in ethno-religious and social conflicts taking place in 
Georgia. However, their involvement varies depending on the region and the size 
of religious centres. A positive aspect of these activities is the effort to mitigate 
conflict,161 while negative aspects are the support of some clerics for nationalist 
groups, giving special blessing to those involved in the conflict, taking over temples 
from followers of other religions, and building temples on ethno-religious bor-
derlands. Of particular importance here is the voice of the head of the Georgian 
Church – the Catholicos, who enjoys the greatest trust of society and so has the 
highest potential to influence the way the situation in Georgia develops. It also 
158  This problem has been generally analysed by A. Curanović, “Kontrolowana ‘zemsta Boga’: znaki 
szczególne poradzieckiego systemu wyznaniowego”, in: Religia i polityka na obszarze Europy 
Wschodniej, Kaukazu i Azji Centralnej, ed. T. Stępniewski, Lublin–Warszawa, 2013, pp. 35–48.
159  P. Michel, Politics and religion in Eastern Europe, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 84–85.
160  Król-Mazur, Polityczne aspekty, pp. 281–303; P. Dundua, “Religious Factors in Georgian Pol-
itics (the 2008 General Elections)”, Central Asia and the Caucasus, 1 (2010), pp.  173–180; 
B. Chedia, “The Georgian Orthodox Church in Current Georgian policy”, Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, 4–5(58–59) (2009), pp. 169–175.
161  The involvement of clerics in overcoming ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts referred to as 
faith-based diplomacy also takes the form of institutional capacity at both national level (e.g. 
various councils, comprising representatives of different Churches), and internationally.
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seems appropriate to refer to Georgia René Girard’s reflection that religion offers 
peace, but its roots are in violence.162 Religion in Georgia inspires nationalist 
entities and supports nationalism. 
Translated by Damian Jasiński
The role of the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church 
in conflicts in the South Caucasus 
Abstract
The dissertation focuses on mutual ties and relations between the Church and the authorities 
and politics in Georgia. The national identity of Georgians is strongly connected with Chris-
tianity and separate ecclesiastical structures. A long tradition of autocephaly and differences 
resulting from autonomous development created a specific feeling of attachment to the Church, 
which Georgians expressed in the opposition to subordinate their Church to Russian Orthodox 
Church, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet power. The position of Georgian Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church in the country’s life after the fall of the communism was shaped by the 
political situation of that period. The role of the national church was strongly emphasised and 
freedom regaining Georgians combined national slogans with their religious orientation. For 
a long time, the Georgian Church was the only one allowed to function in Georgia. The 
authorities, in need of the Church’s support, decided to give it an exceptional role in the state 
(Art. 9 of 1995 Constitution and the “Constitution Agreement” executed and ratified in Octo-
ber 2002 by the parliament and the Holy Synod). These and other provisions included in the 
legal acts resulted in a tremendous preference of the Georgian Church which leads to the 
spreading of religious extremism in the country, initially tolerated by the authorities. However, 
with the demands to introduce political reforms aimed at bringing Georgia closer to the model 
of Western countries and the country’s aspiration to join the European Union, the authorities 
were compelled to take steps and decisions which were contrary to the standpoint and activ-
ity of the Georgian Church. This, however, for long time enjoying incredible social trust, 
managed to maintain its position, among the others due to the ability to skilfully balance 
between the expectations and needs of the authorities and the accomplishment of its own 
goals. The Georgian Church is considered one of the most important actors in the Georgian 
public life and its influence on politics is considerable. It plays a significant role both in exac-
erbating ethnic, religious, and social conflicts in Georgia which translates into the relations of 
the country with its neighbours and the mitigation of emerging problems (after the Geor-
gian-Ossetian-Russian war, the Georgian Church is the sole representative of the State in 
relations with the Russian Federation.
Роль Грузинской Апостольской Автокефальной Православной 
Церкви в конфликтах на Южном Кавказе 
Аннотация
Задачей статьи является приблизить вопросы, связанные с присутствием християнства 
на территории Грузии и показать насколько большую роль играет Грузинская Апостоль-
ская Автокефальная Православная Церковь в истории грузинского народа. Национальная 
162  R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, transl. M. and J. Pleciński, Poznań, 1993.
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идентичность грузин сильно связана с християнством и отдельными церковными струк-
турами, что существенно влияет на отношения с негрузинскими общинами (на Южном 
Кавказе – Грузия – страна с самым большим процентом этнических меньшинств), много 
поколений живущими в Грузии и владеющими местным языком, но к которым относятся 
как к «чужим» из-за «негрузинской» конфессии 
Новые власти (после обретения Грузией независимости в 1991 г.) обеспечили исклю-
чительную роль в государстве Грузинской Апостольской Автокефальной Православной 
Церкви посредством соответствующего законодательства. Это способствовало обостре-
нию отношений с национальными и конфессиональными меньшинствами, а также, 
в большой степени, усилению социальной напряженности и отразилось также на отно-
шениях Грузии с ближайшими соседями. Именно эти аспекты автор подробно рассма-
тривает в представленном тексте и показывает, как в результате специфических отно-
шений, которые образовались в Грузии между церковью и государством, религия была 
подвержена инструментализации и использована для достижения текущих политических 
целей. В заключение статьи утверждается, что религия в Грузии вдохновляет национа-
листические субъекты и поддерживает национализм.
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